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Abstract:  
 
This paper identifies the key historical factors that have shaped the development of the 
financial sector in the Franc Zone. At the heart of the Franc Zone is the Operations Account 
mechanism held at the French Treasury. It is this that differentiates the nature of financial 
integration in the Franc Zone from other low income countries. There are however reasons to 
doubt that the Operations Account mechanism, designed to sustain convertibility through 
overall trade balances, could be effective with a build-up of cross-border debt in the private 
or public sectors of member countries. 
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Introduction 
 
The growth of the financial sector during the era of financial liberalisation is associated with 
the process of financialisation, a process that has been extensively studied in recent years. 
Financialisation is characterized by general tendencies associated with the growth in 
importance of financial markets, financial institutions and financial motives for domestic and 
international economies (Epstein, 2005). This paper contributes to the growing literature on 
financialisation in developing countries (see Bonizzi (2013) for a review), and specifically 
low income countries, by exploring the particularities of financial sector development in the 
Franc Zone.  
 
The Franc Zone consists of a common currency area between two sub regions in Sub Saharan 
Africa and France. Each sub region has a multilateral central bank, with the West African sub 
region’s central bank located in Senegal, and the Central African sub region’s located in 
Cameroon.1 The currency area emerged out of colonial monetary arrangements when France 
consolidated many of its colonies’ currencies and initiated the new currency, the CFA franc.  
 
This paper identifies several key historical and institutional factors that have shaped the 
development of the financial sector in the Franc Zone. At the heart of the Franc Zone is the 
Operations Account mechanism held at the French Treasury. It is this that differentiates the 
nature of financial integration in the Franc Zone from other low income countries. Current 
literature on and policy practice in the Franc Zone contain a series of underlying tensions. 
From the stifling debt crisis during the 1970 and 1980s, the Franc Zone now neatly fits within 
the expanding financial development literature and policy practice which extolls the benefits 
                                                 
1 The West African zone consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Togo and Senegal and the Central African region consists of Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. The Comoros 
Islands are also part of the Franc Zone. 
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of finance with few reservations. During this period, the presentation of government 
borrowing has undergone a transformation: from negative due to crowding out arguments to 
more favourable views arising from the provision of good collateral supposed to promote 
domestic financial deepening. This paper concludes however, that the internal mechanism of 
the Franc Zone, the Operations Account, may prove too strict to accommodate the 
generalized credit boom which is currently underway.  
 
 
I. The Operation Accounts at the French Treasury 
 
Four main pillars constitute the core of the Franc Zone. The first pillar of the Franc Zone is 
that CFA francs are freely convertible into euros at a fixed exchange rate, which prior to 2002 
were convertible into French francs. The parity has remained unchanged from 1948 with the 
exception of the historic devaluation in 1994. The second pillar is that the convertibility 
between CFA francs and hard currency is guaranteed by France and this is done through the 
Operations Account held at the French treasury. The third pillar is that in exchange for the 
convertibility guarantee, the countries of the Franc Zone must maintain the majority of their 
foreign exchange reserves at the two sub regional central banks of the Franc Zone. The fourth 
pillar is the requirement of capital mobility throughout the Franc Zone and between the Franc 
Zone and France (Allechi and Niamkey, 1994; Boughton, 1991). 
 
This set of arrangements has severe macroeconomic implications for the members. Members 
supply the Operations Account with foreign exchange generated through trade surpluses. The 
reserve pooling arrangement implies that countries can credit and debit the Operations 
Account by drawing on and supplying each other with reserves. Countries needing foreign 
exchange debit the Operation Account whilst those supplying non-CFA currencies credit the 
account (Engberg, 1973).  Members’ balance of payments imbalances are financed through 
the Operations Account, either using the pooled reserves of other members that are 
obligatorily kept there or if these do not prove sufficient, through the guarantee by the French 
Treasury to supply necessary foreign exchange via an overdraft facility in the Operations 
Account.  Therefore, the French Treasury steps in when the overall balance of the Operations 
Account is in deficit. The degree of fiscal intervention by France is regulated by the overall 
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payment balance across each sub region, rather than imbalances in individual countries. 
Intervention by the French Treasury is unnecessary if the net overall balance is positive even 
if there are diverging balance of payments needs between the countries. For example, in the 
1980s Benin, Cote D’Ivoire and Senegal drew down the operations of other countries with 
surpluses in the Operations Account, such as Burkina Faso, Niger and Togo (Allechi and 
Niamkey, 1994).  
 
Restrictions are in place in order to safeguard the unlimited guarantee that France provides to 
the Zone. These limitations placed on the Operations Account constrict the ability of 
countries to draw down the ‘unlimited’ overdraft facility provided by France, by in effect, 
making it quite a limited facility. Automatic measures make it more costly to run extended 
deficits in the Operations Account. For example, the regional central banks restrict the 
availability of credit by raising the cost of rediscounting and by limiting the amount of credit 
available to governments. Limitations are imposed on the overdraft facilities of the 
Operations Account in the French Treasury. These include minimum reserve ratios between 
the foreign exchange reserves in French francs and restrictions on the monetary financing of 
governments’ deficits by each central bank. Disciplining mechanisms on members with 
imbalances are invariably also applied politically by France. Apart from the statutory 
regulation between the two central banks and France, political involvement in regulating 
overall credit policy has been instrumental in the monetary arrangements of the Franc Zone. 
The governance of the two central banks has included greater African participation since 
independence, but French officials maintain high representation in the Boards and veto 
power.  
 
Beyond the aforementioned institutional constraints, the fiscal contribution by France into the 
Operation Account is structurally limited by the heterogeneous nature of the Franc Zone itself 
and specifically the asymmetric responses to external shocks. The main consequence of 
reserve pooling has been to reduce the need to rely on France’s overdraft precisely because 
Franc Zone countries have distinct and diverse export structures, which respond in 
unsynchronized ways to changing global conditions. The consequence of this is that countries 
most frequently draw on each other’s reserves rather than relying on France.   
 
This is worth placing in the context of the literature whose examinations of the Franc Zone 
rest on providing economic rationales and theoretical justifications for its continuity by 
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contextualizing the Franc Zone through the optimal currency area lens (Mundell (1961), 
McKinnon (1963), and Fleming (1971)). Aside from the characteristics that, according to this 
theory, allow the benefits of membership of a currency area to exceed the costs, such as wage 
and price flexibility (Mougani, 2014) and high factor mobility (Boughton, 1991), the 
similarity in response to external shocks are frequently-mentioned desirable traits that can 
minimise the relative price shifts among countries. This theory suggests that highly integrated 
countries are more likely to reap benefits from a common currency. Contrary to the optimal 
currency area literature however, there is a small degree of intra-regional trade in the Franc 
Zone and considerable diversity in export structures. The West Africa sub region has 
traditionally relied on the export of coffee and cocoa and the Central African sub region has 
relied on minerals and oil exports. The prices of these commodities may move in different 
directions, which in combination with the changing exchange rate that the exports are priced 
in, lead to changes in competitiveness between the countries in the Franc Zone (Boughton, 
1991). In light of the Operations Account mechanism, it is the presence of features which 
make the Franc Zone non-Optimal in this respect that have allowed for its durability. 
Although a majority of the English-speaking literature on the Franc Zone has optimal 
currency area theory as its starting point, the majority of studies conclude the Franc Zone 
cannot be interpreted in these terms (Boughton, 1991; Fouda and Stasavage, 2000; Hallet, 
2008). Conversely, there is a broad consensus that the durability of the Franc Zone is better 
explained on political grounds (Assoua (2013), Couharde, Coulibaly, Guerreiro, and Mignon 
(2013), Bordo and Jonung (2003) Lamine (2006), Stasavage (2003) and Fouda and Stasavage 
(2000)).  
 
To summarise, the original mechanism of the Franc Zone was budgetary in nature, supported 
by the French Treasury. The Operations Account has been described as resembling a 
“discount window” at the French Treasury for the two central banks (Engberg, 1973). What 
this implies is that the French Treasury performs a central banking function to the two sub 
regions to cover the region’s reserve deficit. Had this arrangement been based in the French 
central bank, financing the overdraft would represent reserve creation by the Bank of France, 
whereas, currently, the overdraft is financed through the budget or by borrowing (Engberg, 
1973).  
 
 
Financial sector development 
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This section discusses historical and institutional changes that have been instrumental in 
shaping and restructuring the Franc Zone’s financial sector. The main drivers that contributed 
to financial sector transformation in the Franc Zone were the conditionality programmes 
implemented by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the institutional re-
organisation following the devaluation in 1994. This section reviews this trajectory 
emphasizing the recent remodeling of the Franc Zone along EU lines.  
 
In the 1980s Franc Zone countries saw their export earnings collapse with the prices of 
primary commodities declining. The sharp appreciation of the French franc under President 
Mitterand’s Franc Fort policy led to a deteriorating terms of trade. Access to the expanding 
international dollar markets grew and the majority of Franc Zone countries were embroiled in 
a severe debt crisis. The entire region went through structural adjustment programmes and 
several rounds of debt restructurings, both through the IFIs and the private Paris Club. A key 
component of the conditionalities attached to these programmes included financial sector 
liberalization and specific reforms to encourage competition within the domestic banking 
sector. This practice has continued with recent conditionality programmes (as an example see 
Cameroon’s PRSP (IMF, 2006)). 
 
The discussion on government borrowing and indebtedness became central during the 
crippling debt crisis. Up to that point few doubted that the main merits of the Franc Zone for 
its members were the disciplinary capacity enforced by the currency union. Indeed fiscal 
discipline and price stability were frequently cited as the main merits of the Franc Zone 
(Boughton, 1991). The rationale was that an exchange rate peg with full convertibility would 
act as a disciplinary mechanism for expansionary fiscal policies since direct monetary 
financing could force the peg to be abandoned. Yet this is not a universally held view, neither 
in theory nor practice. Hadjimichael and Galy (1997) argue that the Operation Account rules 
were not sufficient to instill fiscal discipline.  Stasavage (1997) presents mounting evidence 
for even the strongest proponents of the Franc Zone to agree that fiscal discipline was not 
promoted through the currency and monetary arrangements of the Franc Zone in the 1980s 
and early 1990s.The reasons he gives are the institutional flaws in the design of the union and 
political interests on behalf of French and African elites. The institutional constraints of the 
Zone were circumvented in a number of ways. Under the Operation Account rules direct 
financing of treasuries via the two central banks was limited to 20% of government’s past 
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fiscal receipts. However indirect financing of budget deficits via domestic commercial banks 
which were often government owned circumvented the fiscal borrowing rule of the Franc 
Zone’s central banks. These loans could then be refinanced though the regional central banks 
at subsidised rates (Honohan, 1993). This practice was central to the worsening conditions of 
the late 1980s and was part and parcel of the banking crises that developed in almost every 
Franc Zone country at that time. According to Stasavage (1997), the governments absorbed 
the debts of failed banks, which were then refinanced by the central banks. The consequence 
of this practice meant that the central banks’ positions were weakened. Government deficits 
were also funded from abroad and once access to external commercial borrowing dried up, 
official multilateral loans and donor aid funds were the main or sole source of external 
financing. The de facto practice of accumulating arrears with domestic suppliers and creditors 
also created the image of improved fiscal positions by leaving pensions and payment public 
sector employees unpaid (Stasavage, 1997). As in Stasavage (1997) these choices were 
highly politicised by the de facto importance of French officials in decision making.  
 
A deteriorating balance of payments built pressure to proceed with currency devaluation in 
1994, altering the parity between the CFA franc and the French franc for the first time since 
1948. This prompted deep institutional and policy changes within the Franc Zone. The result 
was the extension of the monetary union to include broader elements of economic and 
financial integration, such as economic, legal and regulatory reforms. The previous 
institutional arrangements were replaced by new ones, and the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Union (CEMAC) and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
were created. The changes that occurred after the devaluation were modelled explicitly on the 
EU’s integration model, thus representing an explicit transfer of norms and institutional 
similarities to the EU (Claeys and Sindzingre, 2003).  
 
As the European Monetary Union members headed towards the third stage of integration and 
the introduction of a single currency, a protracted discussion began about how the Franc Zone 
arrangement ought to be interpreted and treated under Maastricht Rules. At the time of the 
euro’s adoption a new wave of literature emerged which sought to assess the impact that the 
switch of the peg from French franc to euro would have on the Franc Zone. France initially 
argued that given the budgetary nature of the arrangement it should be treated as a domestic 
affair as it was entirely compatible with Maastricht criteria (Care, 1997). However, it was 
agreed that exchange rate arrangements linked to the euro ought to come under European 
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Council oversight, so the switch of the Franc Zone’s peg to the euro mechanism was 
formalised with an EU Council Decision of November 1998 (See Hadjimichael and Galy 
(1997) and Lamine (2006)). The Operation Account mechanism was to remain intact under 
the strict understanding that the European Central Bank remains under no obligation to 
support the peg or the convertibility (Allen and Hagan, 2005). Certain oversight functions 
were moved to the EU level, with any decisions to change the parity with the euro now 
requiring EU approval.  
 
The institutional replication along EU lines followed the devaluation. Two regional 
Commissions, Council of Ministers, and Heads of State meetings have been created and 
common Treaty Law has been established (Lamine, 2006). Economic integration is directed 
through convergence criteria for the Franc Zone countries, which focus on fiscal 
consolidation relating to budget balances, debt levels, wage bills and tax revenues. Attempts 
to meet the criteria occur through corollary multilateral surveillance arrangements, 
constituted in a Treaty along the lines of the EU’s Growth and Stability Pact. The responsible 
authorities for the implementation of these surveillance mechanisms are the regional 
Commissions and similar to the euro area, countries deviating from the convergence criteria 
define a ‘corrective’ programme with the regional Commission (Banque de France, 2014).  
 
A broad set of institutional changes have taken place; a customs Union has been set up, 
common external tariff introduced and duties on intraregional trade removed, common 
business law has been adopted, and a Court of Justice in each Zone has been set up. Financial 
sector reform was pushed forward through setting up new institutions, such as regional 
Bourses and the regional banking commissions, which were responsible for much of the 
financial sector restructuring in the post devaluation period. Central to this push for further 
economic integration has been a set of policies to ‘deepen’ the financial systems of countries 
in the Franc Zone (Cabrillac and Rocher, 2009). At the time these changes were taking place, 
it was argued that the economic benefits of a currency and monetary union would be better 
harnessed if only the Zone was better integrated (Hallet, 2008). Specifically, it was 
recognised that the governments in the Franc Zone needed more effective debt markets to 
avoid recourse to the French Treasury or the International Monetary Fund. The development 
of the financial sector was promoted in order to reduce the financial and economic 
dependence on France.  
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Recent trends in financial deepening 
 
The global financial crisis was frequently attributed as an impetus in the development of Sub 
Saharan debt markets on several accounts. Global investors’ hunt for has encouraged higher 
investment into African markets yields (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009). Regular aid 
funds were reduced as donors cut back on their spending, which necessitated a search for 
alternatives, particularly through developing domestic markets. Long term domestic 
financing was presented as a solution to financing development by enhancing diversification.  
 
With regards to scholarship, there has been a decisive shift within the literature as it tries to 
contend with the latest enthusiasm for securitised government debt and market based 
financial integration. Following the contours of the development finance literature (see 
Bonizzi 2013 for a critique) one finds a plethora of studies that discuss the benefits that could 
come from the expansion of the finance in the Franc Zone (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 
2009; Gulde, 2008). Arguments in favour of local security markets propose that reliance on 
bank lending would be reduced and investment opportunities broadened. The benefits of 
countries moving away from official bilateral and multilateral, mostly concessional lending 
and towards a market based financing, according to this viewpoint, is that capital allocation 
would be enhanced, and the creation of a liquid government securities market would help 
monetary policy implementation.  
 
The practical efforts of the private sector and the donor community to develop domestic bond 
markets have been considerable (Dahou, Omar, and Pfister, 2009; Moyo, 2008). However, 
the efforts at furthering financial deepening have often been disparate and uncoordinated. To 
address this problem, the African Development Bank hosts the collaborations between the 
IFIs, the private sector and the major donors; the creation of the African Financial Markets 
Initiative has the sole goal of developing and deepening domestic financial markets in Africa. 
 
Low income countries have had limited, if any, access to international capital markets. Due to 
the highly concessional external borrowing available to Sub Saharan African countries, local 
borrowing has generally been more expensive. Beaugrand, Loko, and Mlachila (2002: 3) 
argue that “highly concessional external debt is usually superior to domestic debt in terms of 
financial costs and risks, even in face of probable devaluations”. Despite the higher costs 
associated with domestic debt, the promotion of market based financing has placed 
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developing the domestic debt market at the heart of the financial deepening agenda. Local 
security markets have been institutionally promoted by the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank as part of a stepping stone in the overall process of financial development of 
low income countries. For example, the IMF has placed limits on the borrowing low income 
countries under IMF programmes can access at non concessional rates. These limits have 
now been made looser allowing for a greater proportion of non-concessional borrowing for 
Low Income Countries under IMF programmes (Allen and Hagan, 2005). 
 
The arguments in favour of developing local government securities markets are not solely in 
terms of better financing for governments, but rather, are also for the purpose of enhancing 
private sector security markets. “Achieving rapid growth in private debt markets is generally 
the second key objective of a government securities issuance strategy” (Cabrillac and Rocher, 
2009: 10). The development of the government securities market, alongside the institutional 
changes that facilitate it, are seen as prerequisites for the subsequent development of a private 
debt market. A key part of this process is the benchmark created from the government 
securities market from which private securities can be priced. “Yields on government 
securities can serve as a pricing benchmark for long-term private debt issued by banks or 
enterprises” (Abbas and Christensen, 2010: 6). It is argued this would enhance corporate 
bond market development and put pressure for competition on the banking sector (Fabella 
and Madhur, 2003).  
 
The specific experience of the Franc Zone amongst these broader developments is as follows. 
The development of the domestic debt market in the Franc Zone countries has lagged behind 
the development of the domestic debt market in non-Franc Zone Sub Saharan African 
countries which had begun from the 1980s (Christensen 2004: 4). The recent promotion of 
government debt markets has been accompanied by changes in the Franc Zone rules about 
how governments finance themselves. In particular, domestic debt market development is 
linked to increased restriction of direct monetary financing by the regional central banks 
(Banque De France, 2006). The international financial community encouraged the WAEMU 
and CEMAC to move towards central bank independence thus limiting or phasing out the 
direct advances made by central banks to governments. This is evidenced in Figure 1 which 
indicates a steady increased reliance in market and bank based funding for governments in 
the West African sub region and the steady decrease in reliance on central bank financing.  
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<FIGURE 7.1 HERE>  
 
Under the previous rules the Central Banks of the Franc Zone could provide borrowing for 
member governments of up to 20% of their budget. New rules further limit member state’s 
fiscal deficits from being financed by the central banks thus prompting governments to turn 
to issuing securities, and encourage the development of local currency debt markets. As 
indicated in Figure 2 domestic debt became an increasing component of government 
financing as opposed to external debt.  
 
 
<FIGURE 7.2 HERE>  
 
 
Other changes in the Franc Zone include a new credit rating system set up in 2006 to 
encourage bond issuance in the WAEMU region (Moyo, 2008). Institutional barriers were 
targeted and attempts were made to reduce transaction costs. A mortgage market and 
securitization programme begun, spearheaded by the regional Bourse and the custodian agent 
of the regional central bank.  
 
The issuance of debt securities has rapidly increased in the 2000s as shown in Figure 3 and 4.  
 
<FIGURE 7.3 HERE>  
<FIGURE 7.4 HERE> 
 
Certain countries in the Franc Zone have seen a rapid credit growth in the past decade. 
Recent research by Griffith-Jones and Karwowski (2014) shows that for a few of the Franc 
Zone countries, credit growth was close or far above 100% of their GDP. This is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
<TABLE 7.1 HERE>  
 
The changes described above have set up the members of the Franc Zone for a new cycle of 
borrowing. Where the problem of the 1980s was interpreted as a problem of foreign currency 
borrowing, the solution that developed was to expand debt markets in domestic currency. The 
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contribution of domestic debt markets to debt sustainability lies in the greater ease with 
which governments and companies may manage cash flows and borrowing in their own 
currency. However, the most serious challenge posed to the financial sector development 
agenda is the increasing attention drawn to the potential for yet another serious debt crisis in 
the region (see UNCTAD, 2015). This highlights the serious tension as although the risks are 
recognised, the process is continuing rapidly. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown how the analytical and theoretical trajectory in the Franc Zone has been 
shaped on the one hand by the structural changes brought about by the conditionality attached 
to IFI programmes and the explicit modelling along EU lines, whilst on the other hand, the 
gradual application of the financial development literature has created a new policy agenda 
for the Franc Zone. The constraints of the replication of the EU model in the Franc Zone have 
been detailed in Claeys and Sindzingre (2003). To these concerns the on-going crisis of the 
EU can be added, which profoundly affects the feasibility as well as desirability of the model. 
 
The institutional mechanism in the Franc Zone’s centre, the Operations Accounts at the 
French Treasury, may come up against problems in light the promoted credit boom. This is 
associated to the rise in domestic incomes that growth in private sector investment could lead 
to, which would increase the import bill and widen trade deficits. The Operations Account 
mechanism would frustrate this kind of private sector economic development. Furthermore, 
large calls on these accounts could materialize if national authorities (central banks or 
governments) are obliged to act as lenders of last resort in the event of a credit bubble. The 
main condition that falls under normal Franc Zone operations under which this will not 
happen is if export markets expand, or export commodity prices rise. However, this is 
unlikely with slow economic growth in the major economies of the world.  
 
The discussion about the Franc Zone has been almost entirely about the costs and benefits of 
a common currency, in terms of trade competitiveness and fiscal rectitude, to the neglect of 
the impact of the currency arrangements on the debt structures that build up over time. There 
are strong reasons to doubt that the Operations Account mechanism of the Zone, designed to 
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sustain convertibility through overall trade equilibrium in the Zone, could be effective with a 
build-up of cross-border debt in the private or public sectors of member countries. 
 
The way financialisation is experienced under a variety of monetary institutional settings is a 
under researched area, particularly in developing countries. Such research is important to 
assess the impact that general trends of increased market access and security issuance 
currently under way in sub Saharan Africa has on the Franc Zone. It is also necessary, in 
order to distinguish the features that are particular to the Franc Zone countries. Given the 
recent warnings (UNCTAD, 2015) regarding potential vulnerabilities in the build-up of debt 
positions, this paper has attempted to highlight some areas of concern.  
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